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Climate change is aptly described as an environmental, eco-
nomic, political, scientific, ethical, educational, and technological
problem.1  It is regarded by some as the greatest environmentally
related challenge of the twenty-first century, with projected ef-
fects that “occur at a larger geographic scale, adversely affect
more people, and occur over a larger time period than virtually
any other environmental problem now being faced.”2  The com-
plexity of climate change stems in large part from the critical fact
that it “pits the potential disruption of our global climate system
against the future of a fossil fuel-based economy.”3  This logger-
head cannot be overstated.  Policymakers seeking to implement
reformative measures tailored to mitigating the adverse impacts
of climate change must contend with a proverbial train wreck.
The ultimate implication of the climate-change issue is that the
reformative measures it necessitates will likely alter the develop-
ment patterns of industrialized and developing countries
throughout the world,4 and entail a global normative shift
1 Laura H. Kosloff et al., Outcome-Oriented Leadership: How State and Local Cli-
mate Change Strategies Can Most Effectively Contribute to Global Warming Mitiga-
tion , 14 WIDENER L.J. 173, 174 (2004).
2 John C. Dernbach, Toward a Climate Change Strategy for Pennsylvania , 12 PENN
ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 181, 190 (2004).
3 DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
589 (2d ed. 2002).
4 See id.  at 606; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT - SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4
(2001) [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT], http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syreng/
spm.pdf.  The IPCC notes, “The climate change issue is part of the larger challenge
of sustainable development .  As a result, climate policies can be more effective when
consistently embedded within broader strategies designed to make national and re-
gional development paths more sustainable .” Id.  (emphasis added).
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associated with the propriety of climate-changing behaviors.5
This Comment focuses on the frontier of climate policy in the
State of Oregon.  Specifically, in light of the implementation of a
global cap-and-trade system for greenhouse-gas (GHG) emis-
sions under the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol), this Comment exam-
ines the policy option of implementing a regional GHG cap-and-
trade system in Oregon and among the West Coast states.  Much
terrain is covered to give context.  Part I provides a primer on
climate science that describes the potential impacts of climate
change on the global level and in the Pacific Northwest.  After
illuminating the potential threats posed by climate change, Part
II describes the international community’s response, focusing al-
most exclusively on the Protocol’s cap-and-trade regulatory sys-
tem for GHG emissions.  In contrast, Part III shifts attention to
the state and local levels.  It begins by providing a cursory discus-
sion of the climate policies and programs established by states
and localities as well as some of the cutting-edge litigation
brought by states and localities involving climate change.  Part IV
examines climate policies and programs in the State of Oregon,
paying particular attention to the carbon dioxide (CO2) standard
for new energy facilities (the Standard).  Finally, Part V provides
a comparative analysis of the Protocol and the Standard, dis-
cusses how Oregon and the other West Coast states can use the
Protocol as a model to design a regional cap-and-trade system,
and concludes by examining some of the potential obstacles and
benefits associated with implementing such a system.
Overall, this Comment reflects the viewpoint that an interna-
tional effort is needed to address climate change effectively.  The
Protocol is currently the most concrete form of such an effort.
Unfortunately, the United States has chosen to not ratify the
Protocol and has also declined to implement a federal regulatory
program for GHG emissions.  In the face of such federal inac-
tion, this Comment advocates for Oregon and the other West
Coast states to act in conformity with the international response.
5 Ronald B. Mitchell, Flexibility, Compliance and Norm Development in the Cli-
mate Regime , in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLI-
ANCE 65 (Olav Schram Stokke et al. eds., 2005).  Dr. Mitchell describes this
normative shift as follows: “Actions that cause climate change, and the failure to
take actions to avert it, generally have not yet been framed as illegitimate, reprehen-
sible or otherwise inappropriate.  Climate regime institutions and processes must
foster economic, political and social changes that make behaviours that contribute to
climate change appear increasingly inappropriate . . . .” Id.  at 66.
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Ultimately, it is hoped that such actions will compel the federal
government to ratify the Protocol and implement a GHG regula-
tory program, and position Oregon and the other West Coast




A. Basic Concepts and Historical Patterns
A basic understanding of climate science is necessary to for-
mulate and evaluate climate policies.  The greenhouse effect, and
the role of GHGs therein, are central concepts of this science.
Simply put, the greenhouse effect is the planet’s warming mecha-
nism.6  It operates as follows: some of the infrared energy emit-
ted from the Earth’s sunlight-warmed surface is trapped by
GHGs in the atmosphere and redirected back to the surface.7
GHGs essentially function as a blanket around the planet,
preventing energy from escaping from the Earth’s surface and
atmosphere.8  This climate system maintains temperatures within
a hospitable range for all living organisms on Earth.9
Human interference with this climate system constitutes “cli-
mate change” or “global warming,” which is defined as “a change
of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human ac-
tivity  that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and
which is in addition to natural climate variability . . . .”10  The
burning of fossil fuels, agriculture, and land-use changes are all
human activities that increase GHG emissions and concentra-
tions in the atmosphere.11  The primary GHG emitted is CO2,12
6 HUNTER, supra note 3, at 590-91.
7 Id.  at 589.
8 INFO. SERVS., UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE SECRETARIAT, CARING FOR CLIMATE: A GUIDE TO THE CLIMATE
CHANGE CONVENTION AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 3-4 (Joanna Depledge & Robert
Lamb eds., 2003), http://unfccc.int/resource/cfc_guide.pdf.
9 CITY OF PORTLAND & MULTNOMAH COUNTY, LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON
GLOBAL WARMING 2 (2001) [hereinafter LOCAL ACTION PLAN], http://www.portlan-
donline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=112115.
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (art 1, para. 2),
May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 165 [hereinafter
UNFCCC] (emphasis added).  An electronic copy of the UNFCCC is available at
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/ appli-
cation/pdf/conveng.pdf.
11 See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT supra note 4, at 4.
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and fossil-fuel combustion is the primary source of CO2 emis-
sions.13  In short, climate change is essentially the response of the
planet’s climate system to altered concentrations of GHGs in the
atmosphere.14
It should be noted that the United States is the historic and
current leader in GHG emissions.  From 1850 to 2000, the United
States was the primary source of CO2 emissions, contributing
nearly 30% of global totals.15  As of 2000, the United States was
the primary source of all GHG emissions, contributing almost
21%,16 while maintaining the sixth highest per capita GHG emis-
sions.17  By 2025, the United States is projected to be the second-
largest GHG emitter, and China is expected to become the
world’s largest emitter.18  This projection is representative of a
broader pattern whereby developing countries are expected to
contribute the greater share of global GHG emissions by 2025.19
12 KEVIN BAUMERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS 5 fig.2, 6 (2004), http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate%20Data%20new%2Epdf.  CO2 emis-
sions constitute 77% of global GHG emissions. Id.  Emissions of methane and ni-
trous oxide respectively constitute 14% and 8%. Id.  Those gases with the highest
global warming potentials—sulfur hexafluoride, perfluorocarbons, and hydrofluoro-
carbons—comprise the remainder of emissions. Id.
13 Specifically, CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels constitute 59% of
global GHG emissions. Id.
14 HUNTER, supra note 3, at 589.
15 BAUMERT & PERSHING, supra note 12, at 27 tbl.7.  U.S. CO2 emissions consti-
tuted 16.8%-26.8% of global totals in the period 1950-2000, with the variation result-
ing from the method of calculation used. Id.  at 28 tbl.8.
16 Id.  at 4 fig.1.  Overall U.S. GHG emissions ranged from 15.8%-24.1% of global
GHG emissions as of 2000, with the variation resulting from the method of calcula-
tion used. Id.  at 23 tbl.3.
17 Id.  at 25 tbl.5.  As of 2000, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and
Bahrain all had higher per capita GHG emissions than the United States. Id.
Among the major GHG emitting countries, however, only Australia had higher per
capita GHG emissions than the United States at this time. Id.
18 Id.  at 15, 16 fig.10.  China’s GHG emissions are expected to increase 118%
between 2000 and 2025; in contrast, U.S. GHG emissions are projected to increase
39% during this period. Id.
19 Specifically, the developing countries are projected to contribute 55% of global
GHG emissions by 2025. Id.  at 15.  Overall, developing countries’ GHG emissions
are projected to increase 84% from 2000 to 2025, while those of developed countries
are projected to increase 35% during the same period. Id.  at 15, 16 fig.10.
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B. Climate-Change Trends and Projected Impacts at the
Global Level
Established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization
and the United Nations Environment Programme, the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the international
scientific body charged with researching climate change.20  IPCC
data illustrate the climate response described above.  The IPCC
has found that atmospheric GHG concentrations have increased
substantially since pre-industrial times (pre-1750),21 with CO2
concentrations increasing by almost one-third during this pe-
riod.22  At the same time, IPCC data also suggest that the global
mean temperature has increased 0.6°C during the twentieth cen-
tury,23 and it is “very likely  that the 1990s was the warmest dec-
ade, and 1998 the warmest year in the instrumental record (1861-
2000).”24  Considering these data together, the IPCC has deter-
mined that “most of the warming observed over the last fifty
years is likely  due to increases in greenhouse gas concentrations
due to human activities.”25  Looking forward to the twenty-first
century, the IPCC projects that CO2 concentrations will increase
substantially, mainly due to fossil-fuel emissions, and the global
surface temperature will increase 1.4°C-5.8°C, a warming rate
very likely without precedent in the past 10,000 years.26
In terms of the impacts of climate change, the IPCC has stated
that “projected climate change will have beneficial and adverse
effects on both environmental and socio-economic systems, but
the larger the changes and rate of change in climate, the more the
adverse effects predominate.”27  The IPCC has pointed to a rise
in sea levels, precipitation and growing season shifts, increased
20 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION 2 (2004), http://
www.ipcc.ch/about/anniversarybrochure.pdf.
21 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
22 Id.  at 5 tbl.SPM-1.  Atmospheric concentrations of methane and nitrous oxide
have increased almost 151% and 17% respectively during this period. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.  at 4 (emphasis added).  The IPCC uses the term “very likely” to indicate
that there is a 90%-99% chance that a particular statement is true. Id.  at 5 box
SPM-1.
25 Id.  at 5, 31 tbl.SPM-3 (emphasis added).  The IPCC uses the term “likely” to
indicate that there is a 66%-90% chance that a particular statement is true. Id.  at 5
box SPM-1.
26 Id.  at 8.
27 Id.  at 9.
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frequency and intensity of tropical storms, and shifts in plant and
animal ranges as examples of impacts experienced during the
twentieth century.28  In the twenty-first century, the IPCC
projects a number of similar adverse effects.  These include a rise
in sea levels of 0.09 m-0.88 m;29 increased intensity of precipita-
tion events resulting in increased flooding, landslide, and ava-
lanche damages;30 loss of biodiversity; desertification; diminished
air quality;31 and increased drought in continental interiors re-
sulting in diminished crop yields, water supply, and water
quality.32
The most alarming finding from the standpoint of social justice
is that the adverse impacts of climate change will not be propor-
tionally borne by those developed countries whose GHG emis-
sions have thus far most interfered with the climate system.33
The IPCC directly addresses the social inequities associated with
climate change, stating: “[t]he impacts of climate change will fall
disproportionately upon developing countries and the poor per-
sons within all countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in
health status and access to adequate food, clean water, and other
resources.”34  These social inequities are associated with develop-
ing countries’ lack of adaptive capacity.  In short, many develop-
ing countries lack the resources to develop and implement
adaptive measures to combat the adverse impacts of climate
change.  Examples of such measures include air conditioning,
dams, irrigation projects, medical facilities, reservoirs, sea walls,
and water-treatment facilities.  In the absence of such measures,
adverse health impacts such as heat stress; spread of water-borne
diseases; and diminished water quality, air quality, food availabil-
ity, and food quality are projected to unduly affect lower-income
populations, predominantly those within tropical and subtropical
countries.35  In addition, populations in low-lying coastal areas of
developing countries and on small islands are particularly ex-
pected to bear the adverse effects of raised sea levels and “storm
28 Id.  at 6 tbl.SPM-1.
29 Id.  at 9.
30 Id.  at 15 tbl.SPM-2.
31 Id.  at 29.
32 Id.  at 15 tbl.SPM-2.
33 See id.  at 12.
34 Id.
35 See id.  at 9.
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surges,” such as property damage, displacement, and destruction
of fisheries and other coastal resources.36
C. Climate-Change Trends and Projected Impacts in the
Pacific Northwest
The observed trends and projected impacts of climate change
in the Pacific Northwest region align with the IPCC findings.
The region grew warmer and wetter over the twentieth century.37
There has been an annual average-temperature increase of 1°F-
3°F, and an annual average-precipitation increase of 10%.38
These patterns are predicted to intensify during the twenty-first
century.  By the 2090s, average summer temperatures are pro-
jected to have risen by 7°F-8°F and average winter temperatures
by 8°F-11°F.39  Average precipitation is projected to increase
during this period, but the precise amount is uncertain, ranging
from a few percent to as much as fifty percent.40
There would be numerous adverse impacts associated with a
warmer, wetter climate shift in the Pacific Northwest.  Increased
flooding, landslides, and erosion would result from increased pre-
cipitation.41  Coastal inundation and erosion would occur due to
raised sea levels.42  Forest areas would be placed at a greater risk
to fire and pest infestation.43  As a result of reduced snowpack,
water shortages would be exacerbated, resulting in decreased
supplies for irrigation, drinking, and recreation.44  Salmon popu-
lations would decrease due to lower summer and fall flows,45 and
a decline in water quality due to greater sedimentation associated
with flooding and erosion.46  Finally, increased heat waves, heat-
related illnesses and deaths, as well as the possible spread of in-
sect-transmitted diseases associated with a warmer, wetter cli-
36 See id. at 12.
37 NAT’L ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PRO-
GRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE 68 (2001), available at http://
www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/nationalassessment/10NW.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Id.  at 69.
40 Id.
41 Id.  at 73.
42 Id.
43 Id.  at 72.
44 See id.  at 70.
45 Id.
46 Cf. id.
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mate would jeopardize public health.47  Although this list is not
exhaustive, it is apparent from these impacts that substantial
property damage and significant detrimental economic effects
may result from climate change in the Pacific Northwest.  Moreo-
ver, it is likely that the lower-income segments of the regional
population, like those at the global level, will be disproportion-
ately affected because of lesser adaptive capacity.
In sum, the science behind climate change reveals it is an issue
with numerous, profound, and inequitable impacts both at the
global and regional levels.  Fortunately, this science provides
knowledge that can be utilized to create policies designed to miti-
gate these impacts.  Ultimately, such responses will likely require
far-reaching modification of existing fossil fuel-based economic
systems and development patterns.  This is no small feat.  None-




Considering the vast threat that climate change poses in its po-
tential environmental manifestations, as well as the social inequi-
ties that it involves, the international community has been
seemingly slow to construct policy mechanisms to address this is-
sue.48  The development of international climate policy spans the
period from 1979 to the present.49  Although there are many
noteworthy dates and developments along this continuum, the
primary work product of the international community currently
consists of two documents: the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (Convention) and the Protocol.50
This Comment primarily focuses on the Protocol’s policy mecha-
nisms—its GHG cap-and-trade provisions—and contains only a
brief discussion of the Convention in order to describe its rela-
tion to the Protocol.
47 Or. Dep’t of Energy, Climate Change and Oregon, http://www.oregon.gov/ EN-
ERGY/GBLWRM/climhme.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
48 See HUNTER, supra note 3, at 616.
49 Id.  at 615 box 10.7.
50 See INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 3-4.
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A. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
The Convention is the foundational climate-change document.
As a framework agreement, rather than imposing “hard” obliga-
tions, it “sets goals and establishes a cooperative framework de-
signed to reach [them].”51  The Convention entered into force in
1994.52  At present, it enjoys almost global membership: 189 par-
ties have joined, including the United States.53
The Convention’s objective is “to achieve . . . stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference  with the cli-
mate system.”54  In support of this objective, the Convention
identifies several guiding principles: intergenerational equity,
common concern of humankind, common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities, the right to sustainable  development, and the pre-
cautionary principle.55
Pursuant to the Convention’s objective, and in accordance
with its guiding principles, the party countries (Parties) are di-
vided into three groups, each of which is assigned different com-
mitments based on its particular circumstances and needs.56
These three groupings are Annex II Parties, Annex I Parties, and
Non-Annex Parties.57  Annex II Parties consist of the developed
countries, including the United States, Canada, Western Euro-
pean nations, the Nordic countries, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand.58  Annex I Parties consist of all Annex II Parties plus
countries with economies in transition, including the countries of
Eastern Europe and members of the former Soviet Union.59
Non-Annex Parties primarily are developing countries.60
51 John H. Knox, The International Legal Framework for Addressing Climate
Change , 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 136 (2004).
52 Id.  at 135.
53 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETA-
RIAT, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE STATUS
OF RATIFICATION 7 (2006), http://unfccc.int/files/ essential_background/convention/
status_of_ratification/application/pdf/ratlist.pdf.
54 UNFCCC, supra note 10, art. 2 (emphasis added).
55 Id.  at art. 3, paras. 1, 3, 4, (emphasis added).
56 See INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 5-6.
57 See  UNFCCC, supra note 10, art 4.
58 Id.  at annex 2.
59 Id.  at annex 1.
60 INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6.
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Although a full discussion of the Parties’ differentiated com-
mitments under the Convention goes beyond the scope of this
Comment, two points should be mentioned.  First, all Parties to
the Convention are responsible for compiling inventories of
GHG emissions, preparing national programs in order to imple-
ment the Convention, and submitting reports that describe their
implementation actions.61  Second, the Convention does not  im-
pose binding GHG-emissions limits.  Instead, it provides only
that Annex I Parties must commit to the inventories, national
programs, and reports described above, “with the aim  of re-
turning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of these anthro-
pogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
. . . .”62  The Protocol addresses the Convention’s lack of ade-
quate and binding GHG-emissions limits.63
B. The Kyoto Protocol
The Protocol’s full title is the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.64  As al-
luded to above, it is an extension of the Convention that imposes
legally binding GHG-emissions limits on Annex I parties.65  The
Protocol was adopted in 1997 by the Third Conference of the
Parties to the Convention in Kyoto, Japan.66  It shares the Con-
vention’s objective, principles, and taxonomy of Parties.67  Only
Parties to the Convention may become Parties to the Protocol;68
it requires their separate signature and ratification.69  The Proto-
col entered into force on February 16, 2005.70
At the “heart” of the Protocol are its emissions targets.71  Arti-
cle 3 requires Annex I Parties to adopt legally binding emissions
targets that account for emissions of six GHGs: carbon dioxide,
61 UNFCCC art. 4, para. 1(a), (b), (j), supra  note 10.
62 Id.  at art. 4, para. 2(a), (b) (emphasis added).
63 See HUNTER, supra note 3, at 619.
64 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (2005) (Cd. 5379), at 3 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol], available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
65 See INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 4.
66 Id.
67 Id.  at 16.
68 Id.
69 Id.  at 4.
70 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Status
of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/status_of _rat-
ification/items/2613.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
71 INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 17.
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methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons,
and sulfur hexafluoride.72  Annex I Parties must commit them-
selves to one comprehensive emissions limit under which the
emissions of the five non-CO2 GHGs are accounted for by con-
verting them into their CO2 equivalents according to their
respective global-warming potentials.73  The global-warming po-
tential of a GHG is its effect on warming the atmosphere.74  To
illustrate, because methane has a global-warming potential of
twenty-one, the emission of one ton of methane is equivalent to
the emission of twenty-one tons of CO2 for calculation purposes
under the Protocol.
The comprehensive GHG-emissions limit to which each An-
nex I Party commits itself is called an assigned amount.75  These
assigned amounts are the Party’s commitment to reduce GHG
emissions by a certain percentage below its previous emissions at
a set base-year.76  For example, Germany has committed to re-
duce its GHG emissions to 8% below 1990 levels, and its as-
signed amount is 92% of its 1990 levels.77  The Annex I Parties
must meet their assigned amounts by the first commitment pe-
riod, which is 2008-12.78  Specifically, the Protocol requires “each
party’s level of emissions during that period average its commit-
ment amount.”79  The Protocol’s goal is to reduce GHG emis-
sions to at least 5% below 1990 levels by this time.80  Notably,
Non-Annex Parties, including two major GHG emitting coun-
tries, India and China,81 are not bound to assigned amounts
under the Protocol.
72 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 3, para. 1 & annex A.
73 INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 17.
74 Id.
75 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 3, para. 1.
76 Id.  at art. 3, paras. 5, 7-8.  Note that the Annex I Parties’ specific assigned
amounts are listed in Annex B of the Protocol. Id.  at annex B.
77 See id.  at annex B.
78 Id.  at art. 3, para. 7.
79 Knox, supra note 51, at 139.
80 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 3, para. 1.
81 BAUMERT & PERSHING, supra note 12, at 23 tbl.3.  Depending on the calcula-
tion method used, China was the second- or third-largest GHG emitter in 2000 and
contributed between 11.9% and 14.5% of global GHG emissions. Id.  With the
same caveat, India was considered the fifth-, sixth-, or seventh-largest GHG emitter
in 2000, with contributions of 4.2%-5.5% of global totals. Id.  Moreover, as noted
above, China is projected to overtake the United States to become the largest,
global, GHG emitter by 2025. Id.  at 15, 16 fig.10.
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In order to meet their assigned amounts, Annex I Parties must
implement a number of domestic policies and measures aimed at
mitigating climate change.  These include enhancing energy effi-
ciency, promoting renewable energy, favoring sustainable agri-
culture, recovering methane emissions through waste
management, removing subsidies and other market distortions,
and protecting and enhancing GHG sinks.82  These domestic ac-
tions are intended to be the primary means by which Annex I
Parties meet their assigned amounts; the Protocol requires that
such actions must constitute a “significant element” of efforts to
meet these commitments.83
In addition to these primary domestic actions, the Protocol
contains three innovative policy mechanisms that enable Annex I
Parties to meet their assigned amounts.  These are the Protocol’s
“flexibility mechanisms”: joint implementation (JI), the clean de-
velopment mechanism (CDM), and emissions trading.84  Under
JI, Annex I Parties implement sustainable development projects
that reduce GHG emissions (e.g., renewable energy projects), or
increase removals using carbon sinks (e.g., reforestation
projects), in other Annex I countries.85  By implementing such
projects, the investing country generates emission-reduction
units, which can be used to meet its assigned amount.86  Simi-
larly, under the CDM, Annex I Parties implement the same types
of sustainable development projects in Non-Annex countries,87
82 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 2, para. 1(a).
83 This provision is set out in the Marrakesh Accords, Decision 15/CP.7.  Report
of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29
October to 10 November 2001, opened for adoption  Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, [herein-
after Marrakesh Accords], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf.  The Mar-
rakesh Accords originally served as draft decisions to be considered for adoption by
the Parties to the Protocol upon the Protocol’s entry into force.  Hermann E. Ott,
Global Climate , in 12 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 210,
213 (Geir Ulfstein & Jacob Werksman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).  Functionally,
the Marrakesh Accords flesh out the details of how the Protocol will be imple-
mented, including establishing procedures governing the operation and administra-
tion of the flexibility mechanisms. Id.  at 213-16.  The Marrakesh Accords were
recently adopted by the Parties to the Protocol at Montreal 2005. Press Release,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Montreal
Climate Conference Adopts ‘Rule Book’ of the Kyoto Protocol (Nov. 30, 2005),
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/ press_releases_and_advisories/application/
pdf/press051130_marrakesh.pdf.
84 INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 19.
85 See  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 6, para. 1.
86 Id.  at art. 3, paras. 10-11 & art. 6, para. 1.
87 Id.  at art. 12, paras. 2-3.
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and the investing country earns certified emissions reductions,
which can be used to meet its assigned amount.88  Finally, under
emissions trading, Annex I Parties may trade the emission-reduc-
tion units and certified emissions reductions that they have
earned by implementing JI or CDM projects,89 and may also
trade assigned-amount units, which are units in excess of those
needed by the particular Annex I Party to meet its assigned
amount.90
It is important to note that only  Annex I Parties that have rati-
fied the Protocol may participate in the flexibility mechanisms.91
Although this particular limitation is clear, the extent to which an
Annex I Party may utilize the mechanisms to meet its assigned
amount is an issue that has not yet been precisely determined.
The Protocol currently imposes no quantitative limit, requiring
only that use of the flexibility mechanisms must be “supplemen-
tal to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments . . . .”92
When an Annex I Party fails to meet its assigned amount, de-
spite domestic actions and use of the flexibility mechanisms, two
substantial consequences result.  First, the Party must make up
the difference by which it failed to meet its assigned amount, plus
a penalty of 30% of that deficiency, in the subsequent commit-
ment period.93  For example, if Germany exceeded its assigned
amount by 1000 tons in the first commitment period, it would
have 1300 tons deducted from its assigned amount in the second
commitment period.  Second, the Party’s eligibility to sell credits
under emissions trading will be suspended.94
The Protocol’s emissions limits and flexibility mechanisms
took effect when the Protocol entered into force in early 2005.
88 Id.  at art. 3, para. 12.
89 Id.  at art. 3, paras. 10-12 & art. 6.
90 See id.  at art. 17; INFO. SERVS., supra note 8, at 20.
91 The Marrakesh Accords establish that an Annex I Party is eligible to partici-
pate in the flexibility mechanisms subject to three conditions: (1) the Party has rati-
fied the Protocol, (2) the Party is in compliance with the Protocol’s methodological
and reporting requirements, and (3) the Party is in compliance with the procedures
and mechanisms contained in Decision 24/CP. 7: (a) adoption of a national GHG
inventory system, (b) adherence to the Protocol’s compliance procedure.  Mar-
rakesh Accords, Decision 15/CP.7, supra  note 83, para. 5.
92 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, arts. 6 & 17.
93 Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP. 7, supra  note 83, § 15, para. 5(a).  An
electronic copy of Decision 24/CP. 7 appears at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/
13a03.pdf#page=64.
94 Id.  at § 15, para. 5(c).
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Entry into force required ratification by at least fifty-five Parties
to the Convention, including enough Annex I Parties to account
for at least 55% of that group’s GHG emissions in 1990.95  Al-
though the first condition had been met for some time, the sec-
ond was not satisfied until late 2004.  On November 18, 2004,
almost seven years after the Protocol’s initial adoption, the Rus-
sian Federation, which accounts for 17.4% of the Annex I Par-
ties’ 1990 GHG emissions, deposited its ratification instrument
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.96  With Rus-
sia’s ratification, Annex I countries accounting for 61.6% of that
group’s 1990 GHG emissions had ratified the Protocol.97  Both
conditions satisfied, the Protocol entered into force ninety days
after Russia’s deposit.98
In sum, February 16, 2005, marked the entry into force of an
international climate-change treaty that imposes binding GHG-
emissions limits on many of the world’s developed countries.
While there is no question that the Convention and Protocol will
have to be improved upon in order to address climate change in
the most effective and proportional manner, two points are pres-
ently clear.  First, as evidenced by both the Convention and Pro-
tocol, the international community perceives climate change as a
formidable human-caused problem that must be addressed with a
global response.  Second, the international community has cho-
sen the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system as the preferred policy
mechanism for mounting that response.
III
CLIMATE-POLICY EFFORTS AT THE STATE AND LOCAL
LEVELS—FILLING AND REBUKING THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY VOID
Although the majority of the world’s industrialized countries
have ratified the Protocol, the United States has elected to ad-
dress climate change unilaterally.  The Bush Administration an-
nounced its intention to not ratify the Protocol in March 2001
95 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 25, para. 1.
96 Press Release, United Nations Environment Programme, Russia’s Ratification
of the Kyoto Climate Treaty “Historic” Says Kofi Annan, (Nov. 18, 2004), http://
unfccc. int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/
press041119_unep.pdf.
97 Richard M. Schwartz et al., Environmental Disclosure Requirements Under the
Federal Securities Laws , 1489 PRAC. L. INST. 115, 135 (2005).
98 Id.
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and subsequently implemented a climate policy that aims for an
18% reduction in the GHG intensity of the U.S. economy by
2012.99  Although the efficacy of this policy is questionable,100 the
critical point for purposes of this Comment is that it is voluntary
and imposes no binding GHG-emissions limits.101  Thus, the
United States has rejected the Protocol’s GHG cap-and-trade
system and implemented a policy that lacks the legal effect of a
federal regulatory program.
A. State and Local Climate Policies and Programs
The absence of an adequate federal program has created a reg-
ulatory vacuum in the United States.102  States, localities, and
companies have emerged to fill this vacuum by establishing their
own policies and programs to limit GHG emissions.103  In short,
federal inaction on climate change has “simply moved the locus
of the response from the federal government to the state and lo-
cal governments and the private sector.”104
Although a full survey of state, local, and private climate poli-
cies and programs is beyond the scope of this Comment,105 the
momentum in this area is apparent when considering local and
state actions broadly.  At the local level, more than 150 U.S. cit-
ies and counties currently participate in the International Council
99 See Knox, supra note 48, at 145.  A reduction in GHG intensity refers to a
reduction in the amount of GHGs released per unit of gross domestic product. Id.
100 Id.  at 146.  Professor Knox, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and
The Economist  all suggest that the GHG-intensity policy could actually allow for
increased GHG emissions. Id.
101 Id.
102 See  Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Local Solutions for Global Problems: The De-
bate Over the Causes and Effects of Climate Change and Emerging Mitigation Strate-
gies for States, Localities and Private Parties , 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004).
103 Id. at 2-3; see also Kosloff, supra note 1, at 188-93.
104 McKinstry, supra note 102, at 2.
105 There are a number of published materials that provide thorough surveys of
current state, local, and private climate-policy efforts.  These include: Robert B. Mc-
Kinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and
Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of
Climate Change , 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004), and BARRY G. RABE, PEW
CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GREENHOUSE & STATEHOUSE: THE
EVOLVING STATE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE (2002), http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states%5Fgreenhouse%2Epdf.  In addition to
these materials, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change maintains a database of
information about state and local programs, which is available at http://
www.pewclimate.org/states.cfm.
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for Local Environmental Initiative’s Cities for Climate Protec-
tion Campaign.106  This campaign enables these localities to im-
plement and coordinate climate policies and programs that
promote energy efficiency and reduce GHG emissions in all
emitting sectors.107  At the state level, forty-one states have com-
pleted GHG inventories to identify emissions sources within
their boundaries,108 and at least twenty-eight states have com-
pleted state action plans to reduce these GHG emissions.109  Col-
lectively, these state efforts have been described as “quietly
redefining American climate change policy.”110
One state-based program of central relevance to this Comment
is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  Initiated in
April 2003 by Governor George Pataki of New York,111 the
RGGI is a joint effort by seven Northeast and Mid-Atlantic
states to implement a regional GHG cap-and-trade program.112
The program will initially regulate CO2 emissions from power
plants in the participating states.113  After this initial implementa-
tion, the states will consider expanding the program to regulate
additional GHGs beyond CO2, and to regulate additional GHG-
emissions sources beyond the electricity-generation sector.114
Notably, although the RGGI’s system has a regional focus, its
guiding principles for program design and organizational struc-
ture both expressly indicate that states not currently participating
may join in the future.115  Overall, the RGGI is especially note-
106 Information about the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign—including a
list of current membership—is available at http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1118
(last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
107 Id.
108 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, State GHG Inventories, http://yosemite.epa.gov/
OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/EmissionsStateGHGInventories.html (last visited
Aug. 6, 2006).
109 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Action Plans, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar%5Cglobal
warming.nsf/content/ActionsStateActionPlans.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
110 RABE, supra note 105, at 1.
111 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/
about.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
112 See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDER-
STANDING 1-7, http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2006).  The current RGGI member states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Id.
113 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, supra  note 111.
114 Id.
115 REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INI-
TIATIVE (RGGI): GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, AND SHORT-TERM ACTION ITEMS 1-3,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfinal.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
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worthy because it exemplifies a committed regional response to
climate change that utilizes the same policy mechanism as the
Protocol: a cap-and-trade system.  The RGGI is currently sched-
uled to be implemented in 2009.116
B. Climate-Change Litigation
Beyond the foregoing internal activities, states and localities
are attempting to engage the federal government in taking more
concrete action on climate change.  In July 2002, acting on the
conviction that climate change is the “most pressing environmen-
tal challenge of the twenty-first century,” attorneys general from
eleven states wrote a letter to President Bush urging him to take
a “strong national approach” to the problem.117  The attorneys
general noted that their states were addressing climate change
independently in the absence of federal leadership.118
Subsequent to this letter, states and localities have attempted,
with mixed results, to use litigation as a means to force federal
and private regulation of GHG emissions.  A cursory review of
the following three cases provides insight into the novel area of
climate-change litigation.
First, in Friends of the Earth v. Watson , filed in August 2002,
the cities of Boulder, Colorado; Oakland, California; and Arcata,
California joined Greenpeace in bringing suit against the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import
Bank of the United States for violations of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).119  Both Overseas Private Investment Corporation
and Export-Import Bank are government corporations.120  The
former provides insurance and loan guarantees for projects in de-
veloping countries, while the latter facilitates U.S. exports in
116 REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTAND-
ING, supra  note 112, at 2, 7.
117 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., State of California, State Attorneys
General Press Bush Administration for Federal Leadership to Address Global
Warming (July 17, 2002), available at  http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2002/02-
080.htm (internal quotations omitted). The letter referenced was sent by the attor-
neys general of Alaska, California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. Id.
118 Id.
119 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
120 Id.
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overseas markets.121  The plaintiffs allege that, without comply-
ing with the requirements of NEPA and the APA, Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation and Export-Import Bank provided
financial assistance to projects that are responsible for substantial
amounts of CO2 and methane emissions, and thereby contribute
to climate change.122  At the time of this writing, the most recent
action on this case occurred in August 2005, when the Northern
District of California denied the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, determining in part that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
demonstrated the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability ele-
ments necessary for Article III standing.123
Second, in Massachusetts v. EPA ,124 filed in October 2003,
twelve states, three major U.S. cities, two U.S. territories, and
several environmental groups brought suit challenging a July
2003 ruling by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that
it lacks statutory authority to regulate CO2, methane, nitrous ox-
ide, and hydrofluorocarbons under the Clean Air Act.125  Con-
trary to this position, the EPA had previously provided
congressional testimony and statements that it was so author-
ized.126  New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer explained his
State’s decision to file suit in pointed remarks, stating, “[t]he vac-
uum of federal leadership on global warming by the Bush Ad-
ministration is a betrayal of the best interests of the American
people,” and “[t]his failure to act is harming public health and
the environment and will continue to do so for generations to
come.  With no leadership from Washington, our only recourse is
to turn to the courts for relief.”127
In July 2005, the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s refusal to regu-
late the aforementioned greenhouse gases under section
121 Id.
122 Id.  at *3.
123 Id.  at *2-*4.
124 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert . granted , 126 S. Ct.
2960 (2006).
125 Id.  at 53, 56; see also  Press Release, Office of the Massachusetts Att’y Gen.,
States, Cities, Environmental Groups Sue on Global Warming, Challenge EPA’s Re-
fusal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Pollution (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://
www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=986&id=1111.  The states that filed suit were
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon , Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id.  (emphasis ad-
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202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.128  The court deferred to the Ad-
ministrator’s “policy judgments” as well as the agency’s decision
to forego rulemaking “[u]ntil more is understood about the
causes, extent and significance of climate change and the poten-
tial options for addressing it.”129  Writing in concurrence, Judge
Sentelle further concluded that the petitioners had not shown a
sufficiently particularized injury to establish the injury-in-fact el-
ement necessary for Article III standing.130  Judge Tatel’s lengthy
dissenting opinion disagreed with both grounds for the decision,
determining that: (1) Massachusetts’ claimed injury resulting
from rising sea levels was sufficient to confer constitutional
standing;131 (2) EPA’s argument that it lacks statutory authority
fails under Chevron step one based on the plain language of sec-
tions 202(a)(1) and 302(g) of the Clean Air Act;132 and (3) EPA’s
arguments regarding its discretion to refrain from making  an en-
dangerment finding, as well as the statutorily permissible bases
for finding no endangerment, were rooted in an erroneous inter-
pretation of section 202(a)(1).133  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Massachusetts v. EPA  on June 26, 2006, with oral
arguments currently scheduled for the Court’s October 2006
term.134
Third, in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. , filed in
July 2004, eight states, New York City, and several environmental
groups sued five major electric utility companies alleged to be
the “five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United
States.”135  In order to curtail the defendants’ CO2 emissions, the
plaintiffs relied on both the federal and state common law of
public nuisance and sought an order: (1) “holding each of the
Defendants jointly and severally liable for contributing to the
ongoing public nuisance, global warming,” and (2) “enjoining
each of the Defendants to abate its contribution to the nuisance
by capping its emissions of carbon dioxide and then reducing
those emissions by a specified percentage each year for at least a
128 Massachusetts , 415 F.3d at 58.
129 Id.  at 57-58.
130 Id.  at 59-60 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
131 Id.  at 64-67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
132 Id.  at 67-73 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
133 Id.  at 73-82 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
134 Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006).
135 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).  The eight states bringing suit were Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
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decade.”136  In September 2005, the Southern District of New
York granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the suit on juris-
dictional grounds, invoking prudential principles.137  Specifically,
the court determined that the case presented non-justiciable po-
litical questions, stating “[b]ecause resolution of the issues
presented here requires identification and balancing of eco-
nomic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security inter-
ests, ‘an initial determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion’ is required.”138
C. Climate Policy in the State of Oregon
Efforts to mitigate climate change made by the State of Ore-
gon and City of Portland demonstrate an awareness and a will-
ingness resembling those of the international community in
ratifying the Protocol, those of the Northeastern and Mid-Atlan-
tic states currently designing the RGGI, and those of the locali-
ties and states attempting to use litigation as a means for
reducing GHG emissions.  Both the State of Oregon and City of
Portland have emerged as progressive leaders in the area of cli-
mate policy.
In 1993, extending from its involvement in the Cities for Cli-
mate Protection Campaign, Portland became the first U.S. city to
adopt a plan to reduce CO2 emissions.139  In 2001, this plan was
joined by Multnomah County and became the Local Action Plan
on Global Warming (Local Action Plan).140  The Local Action
Plan consists of six components aimed at reducing GHG emis-
sions: energy-efficiency initiatives; transportation reductions; re-
newable-energy promotion; solid-waste reduction and recycling
promotion; forestry and carbon-offsets enhancement; and policy,
research, and education.141  The Local Action Plan’s ultimate
goal is to reduce CO2 emissions to 10% below 1990 levels by
2010.142  Although it is questionable whether this goal will be
reached, the plan has thus far been partially successful.  In 2004,
136 Id.  at 270.
137 Id.  at 274.
138 Id.
139 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Portland’s Local Action Plan Learned from Stock-
holm and Copenhagen, http://www.epa.gov/innovation/international/ airclimate.htm
(last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
140 LOCAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 9, at 1.
141 Id.  at 5, 7.
142 Id.  at 1.
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despite rapid population and economic growth, overall CO2
emissions in Multnomah County were “only slightly above 1990
levels,” and per capita emissions had fallen by 12.5%, a reduction
regarded as “an achievement likely unequalled in any other ma-
jor U.S. city.”143
Like the City of Portland, the State of Oregon has been proac-
tive in addressing climate change.  It is one of the twenty-eight
states that has implemented state action plans to reduce GHG
emissions.144  Oregon’s maintenance of a three-decade old, com-
prehensive land-use planning program is an important part of its
efforts.  This program’s enumerated goals include conservation
of the State’s forest and agricultural land base,145 and it is report-
edly responsible for preventing the loss of 1.2 million acres of
forest and agricultural land.146  In addition to the land-use plan-
ning program, Oregon currently administers residential and busi-
ness tax-credit programs that promote investments in renewable
energy, recycling, energy-efficient vehicles, and energy-conserva-
tion improvements.147
A recent and fairly well-publicized addition to the State’s ef-
forts to mitigate climate change is the push by Governor Ted
Kulongoski to implement California’s GHG-emissions standards
for vehicles in Oregon.  In August 2005, the Governor vetoed
language contained in an appropriations bill for the Oregon De-
partment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) prohibiting the
agency from adopting the GHG-emissions standards.148  The
Governor’s action was challenged in state court but ultimately
upheld as a valid exercise of the item veto power contained in
143 CITY OF PORTLAND & MULTNOMAH COUNTY, GLOBAL WARMING PROGRESS
REPORT: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CITY OF PORTLAND AND MULTNOMAH
COUNTY LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON GLOBAL WARMING 1 (2005), http://
www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=112118.
144 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Action Plans, supra note 109.
145 OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2004).  Goals four and five, respectively, address
maintaining and conserving the forest and agricultural land base. Id.
146 GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP ON GLOBAL WARMING, OREGON STRATEGY
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS 94 (2004), http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/
GBLWRM/docs/GWReport-FInal.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY
GROUP].
147 The rules governing the Residential Energy Tax Credit Program are contained
in OR. ADMIN. R. 330-070-0010 to -0097 (2004).  The rules governing the Business
Energy Tax Credit Program are contained in OR. ADMIN. R. 330-90-0105 to -0150
(2004).
148 Michelle Cole, Governor Clears Way for Stricter Auto Rules , OREGONIAN,
(Portland) Aug. 30, 2005, at A1.
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article V, section 15a of the Oregon Constitution.149  Subsequent
to the veto, relying on a report from his Vehicle Emissions Work-
group, the Governor directed the DEQ to develop administra-
tive rules containing the GHG-emissions standards for
presentation to the Environmental Quality Commission.150  The
DEQ fulfilled this mandate by drafting temporary rules for Ore-
gon’s Low Emission Vehicles (LEV) program,151 which were
unanimously adopted by the Environmental Quality Commission
in December 2005.152  Ultimately, on June 22, 2006, the Environ-
mental Quality Commission adopted permanent LEV rules,
making Oregon the tenth state to implement California’s GHG-
emissions standards.153
Notably, Oregon’s permanent adoption of the LEV rules will
also result in California’s GHG-emissions standards becoming ef-
fective in Washington, which adopted the standards contingent
upon Oregon’s doing so.154  Accordingly, Governor Kulongoski
has described the end result of Oregon’s implementation of the
GHG-emissions standards for vehicles as follows: “The entire
West Coast will have the same heightened standards, and the
pressure for the automobile industry to transition to cleaner
cars—not just on the West Coast, but also nationally—will be
inevitable.”155
As set out in Oregon Benchmark #76, the near-term goal of
the State’s foregoing efforts is to prevent CO2 emissions gener-
ated within the State from exceeding 1990 levels.156  Despite this
goal, Oregon’s GHG-emissions inventory in 2000 revealed that
149 Ferrioli v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Civil No. 05C-18514, at 14 (Cir. Ct.,
Marion County, March 23, 2006), available at  http://www.calcleancars.org/legal/
Opinion_Letter_MSJ.pdf.
150 Letter from Ted Kulongoski, Governor, State of Oregon, to Stephanie Hal-
lock, Director, Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Nov. 23, 2005), http://gover-
nor.oregon.gov/Gov/pdf/letters/deq112305.pdf.  The Vehicle Emissions Workgroup
Report is available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/aq/aqplanning/ORLEV/docs/05Nov
02WorkgroupRpt.pdf.
151 Memorandum from Stephanie Hallock, Director, Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
to Envtl. Quality Comm’n 1 (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/
about/eqc/agendas/attachments/2005dec/F-CalLEVtemprule.pdf.
152 Memorandum from Stephanie Hallock, Director, Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
to Envtl. Quality Comm’n 1 (June 22, 2006), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/
aq/ aqplanning/ORLEV/docs/finalstaffreport.pdf.
153 Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, DEQ’s Low Emission Vehicle Information, http://
www.deq.state.or.us/aq/aqplanning/ORLEV/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
154 Hallock, supra  note 152, at 1.
155 Cole, supra note 148.
156 GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 146, at 9.
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CO2 emissions were 18% above this level.157  Thus, it appears
unlikely that the State will make its mark.  However, the most
important point for the purposes of this Comment is that the
State’s activities demonstrate its willingness to develop and im-
plement progressive climate policy.  The discussion contained in
the following section regarding the Oregon Standard further evi-
dences this spirit.
D. The Oregon Standard—A Regulatory Cornerstone
Central to Oregon’s current climate policies is the CO2 stan-
dard for new energy facilities.158  Alongside the recently adopted
LEV rules, the Standard occupies a central role in the State’s
GHG regulatory program.  The Standard is essential for two rea-
sons: (1) CO2 is the dominant GHG emitted in Oregon, account-
ing for 84% of GHG emissions in 2000;159 and (2) electricity
generation is the primary economic sector in which CO2 is emit-
ted, contributing to 42% of CO2 emissions in 2000.160  In short,
the Standard regulates the State’s most prevalent type of GHG
emissions from the highest-emitting sector.
The Standard emerged in 1997, when the Oregon Legislature
passed House Bill 3283, authorizing the Energy Facility Siting
Council (Council) to set CO2-emissions standards for energy fa-
cilities that are proposed for construction and operation within
the State.161  The Standard is hailed as the first law enacted in the
United States “aimed at reducing [GHG] levels in the atmos-
phere.”162  It operates as follows: acting under the authority con-
ferred by section 469.503(2) of the Oregon Revised Statutes, the
Council utilizes three CO2-emissions standards (collectively, the
Standard) when determining whether to issue site certificates to
157 Id.  at B-3 app. B.
158 For a detailed explanation of the Standard, see OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ORE-
GON CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION STANDARDS FOR NEW ENERGY FACILITIES, http://
egov.oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/docs/ccnewst.pdf (last visited June 2, 2006)
[hereinafter OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OREGON CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION
STANDARDS].
159 GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 146, at 29, B-2 app. B.
160 Id.  at B-3 app. B.
161 OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OREGON CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION STANDARDS,
supra note 158, at 1.  The CO2-emmissions standards are set out in OR. ADMIN. R.
345-024-0500 to -0720 (2004).
162 THE CLIMATE TRUST, PURCHASING QUALITY OFFSETS IN AN EMERGING MAR-
KET: THE CLIMATE TRUST’S FIVE YEAR REPORT TO THE ENERGY FACILITY SITING
COUNCIL 1 (2004) (unpublished report, on file with author).
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developers proposing to construct and operate energy facilities
within Oregon.163  First, a CO2-emissions standard is set for base-
load, natural-gas-fired power plants.164  These power plants util-
ize natural gas to generate electricity and may operate full time
(around-the-clock, 8,760 hours annually) under their site certifi-
cates.165  Notably, while the Council has not yet set a CO2-emis-
sions standard for base-load power plants that utilize fossil fuels
other than natural gas (e.g., coal), the Council has authority to do
so under section 469.503(2) in the event that such facilities are
proposed.  Second, a CO2-emissions standard is set for non-base-
load power plants.166  These are fossil-fuel power plants that op-
erate three-quarters of the time (6,600 hours or less annually)
under their site certificates.167  Third, a CO2-emissions standard
is set for non-generating energy facilities.168  This third standard
is most commonly applied to underground natural-gas storage
facilities.169
As described above, when applying to the Council for a site
certificate, the developer of a proposed energy facility must
demonstrate that the facility will meet the relevant CO2--emis-
sions standard.170  One way that developers may meet these stan-
dards is through carbon-offset projects.  Under the Standard, an
“offset” means an action that will be implemented by the appli-
cant, by a third party, or through a “qualified organization” to
avoid, sequester, or displace CO2 emissions.171  Based on this lan-
guage, an applicant has two alternatives when utilizing carbon-
offset projects to meet the relevant emissions standard.  First, the
applicant or a third party with whom the applicant contracts may
163 Id.
164 OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0550 (2004).  The Council has set the CO2-emissions
standard for base-load, natural-gas facilities at 17% below the emissions rate of the
most efficient base-load gas plant operating in the United States See OR. ADMIN. R.
345-024-0570 (2004).
165 See OR. ADMIN. R. 345-001-0010(7) (2004).
166 OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0590 (2004).  The Council has also set the CO2-emis-
sions standard for non-base-load plants at 17% below the current state-of-the-art
level. See OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0610 (2004).
167 See OR. ADMIN. R. 345-001-0010(36) (2004).
168 OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0620 (2004).
169 OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OREGON CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION STANDARDS,
supra note 158, at 5.
170 OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503(2) (2005).
171 OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503(2)(e)(I) (2005).
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directly implement carbon-offset projects.172  Second, the appli-
cant may pay funds to a “qualified organization” responsible for
obtaining carbon offsets by investing in offset projects.173  This
second method is called the “Monetary Path.”174  Notably, there
are no limitations on the geographic locations of offset projects
under either alternative.175
Under the Monetary Path, the sole “qualifying organization”
in Oregon is a non-profit organization called the Climate
Trust.176  Headquartered in Portland, the Climate Trust is one of
the largest and most experienced offset-project investors in both
U.S. and international markets.177  It currently has ten carbon-
offset projects in its portfolio,178 which together will offset 1.9
million tons of CO2.179  These projects include the purchase of
1600 acres of old growth forest in Washington State,180 reforesta-
tion of 680 acres in a biological preserve in northwest Ecuador,181
financing of a cogeneration facility at a lumber mill in Lakeview,
Oregon,182 and financing of a truck stop electrification project in
Oregon and Washington.183
To summarize this Part, federal inaction over climate change
has prompted states and localities to establish climate policies
and programs of their own accord, as well as to resort to litiga-
172 OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503(2)(c)(B) (2005).  Pursuant to this statute, OR. AD-
MIN. R. 345-024-0560(2), -0600(2), and -0630(1) (2004) allow for direct or third-party
implementation of carbon-offset projects.
173 OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503(2)(c)(C)-(D) (2005).  Pursuant to this statute, OR.
ADMIN. R. 345-024-0560(3), -0600(3), and -0630(2) (2004) allow for payment of
funds to a “qualified organization” that implements carbon-offset projects.  The stat-
utory definition of “qualified organization” is set in OR. REV. STAT.
§ 469.503(2)(e)(K) (2005).  As of 2003, the monetary-offset rate is set at eighty-five
cents per ton of CO2 emitted. OR. ADMIN. R. 345-024-0580 (2004).
174 OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OREGON CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION STANDARDS,
supra  note 158, at 7.
175 Id.  at 6.
176 Id.  at 9.
177 The Climate Trust, The Climate Trust’s Offset Portfolio, http://www.climate
trust.org/offset_projects.php (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 The Climate Trust, Preservation of a Native Northwest Forest, http://www.cli-
matetrust.org/offset_native.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
181 The Climate Trust, Ecuadorian Rainforest Restoration, http://www.climate
trust.org/offset_rainforest.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
182 The Climate Trust, Lumber Mill Cogeneration, http://www.climatetrust.org/
offset_mill.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
183 The Climate Trust, Truck Stop Electrification, http://www.climatetrust.org/off-
set_truckstop.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
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tion, in order to bring about regulation of GHGs.  The RGGI is
an important and progressive regional example of current policy
efforts.  In addition, the Local Action Plan and the State of Ore-
gon’s climate policies, particularly the LEV rules and the Stan-
dard, are further examples.  The remainder of this Comment
examines how Oregon’s current climate-change regime can be
developed to regulate GHG emissions more comprehensively
and effectively.
IV
UTILIZING THE PROTOCOL TO SHAPE OREGON
CLIMATE POLICY
Here in Oregon, we’re putting together a battle plan to reduce
greenhouse gases—the primary cause of global warming . . . .
We are not going to wait for federal leadership.  We’ve got too
much to lose if global warming continues unabated.  And we’ve
got too much to gain by being a leader in climate solutions.
—Governor Ted Kulongoski184
Parts II and III describe two conditions that are relevant to the
shape of Oregon’s future climate-change regime.  First, the inter-
national community has chosen the Protocol’s GHG cap-and-
trade system as the preferred policy mechanism for addressing
climate change.  Second, Oregon’s existing climate policies, par-
ticularly the LEV rules and the Standard, evidence the State’s
willingness to address this issue in a progressive manner.  This
Part argues that the State’s willingness would be best channeled
by implementing policies reflective of the international response.
Specifically, using the Standard as a foundational reference
point, this Part advocates for and examines the ramifications of
implementing a GHG regulatory system modeled in whole or in
part after the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system.
A. A Comparative Analysis of the Standard and
the Protocol
As the first law “aimed at reducing [GHG] levels in the atmos-
phere,”185 the Standard should be praised as a progressive policy
that deliberately aims to mitigate the potentially adverse impacts
of climate change.  Notwithstanding this deserved recognition, a
comparison of the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system with the Stan-
184 See GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 146, at 3 (emphasis added).
185 See THE CLIMATE TRUST, supra note 162, at 1.
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dard’s cap and offset provisions illustrates that the former is a
more comprehensive and effective system for regulating GHG
emissions.
In terms of caps, the Protocol’s regulatory scope is of much
greater breadth and depth than that of the Standard.  Simply put,
the Protocol regulates a greater number of emissions sources and
a greater number of GHGs.
There are two self-evident distinctions that illustrate the Proto-
col’s broader regulatory scope with respect to GHG-emissions
sources.  First, the Protocol regulates GHG emissions from all
fossil-fuel-burning economic sectors: the electricity-generation,
transportation, industrial, and residential- and commercial-build-
ing sectors.  In contrast, as a siting standard for energy facilities,
the Standard only regulates GHG emissions from the electricity-
generation sector.  Second, solely with respect to the electricity-
generation sector, the Protocol requires accounting for GHG
emissions from all existing energy facilities when determining
whether an Annex I Party has met its assigned amount.  By com-
parison, the Standard’s caps apply only to energy facilities that
have been proposed and constructed since its enactment.  This
distinction can be thought of in terms of grandfathering.  The
Standard exempts grandfathered energy facilities from its caps,
while the Protocol does not.  Again, this is to be expected as the
Standard is, by definition, a siting standard.
The scope of regulated GHGs is a second difference between
the Protocol and the Standard.  The Protocol is also more far-
reaching in this regard.  The Protocol regulates and accounts for
emissions of six GHGs when determining whether an Annex I
Party has met its assigned amount.186  In comparison, the Stan-
dard only caps CO2 emissions.  This exclusive focus on CO2 emis-
sions appears to be a limited approach to regulating GHG
emissions in the electricity-generation sector, which, in Oregon,
consists predominantly of power plants that utilize natural gas
and coal.187  CO2 is the primary GHG emitted from such facili-
186 To reiterate, these six GHGs include CO2, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See supra text ac-
companying notes 72-74.
187 Or. Dep’t of Energy, Power Plants in Oregon, http://www.oregon.gov/ EN-
ERGY/SITING/power.shtml (last visited Aug. 8, 2006).  On the regional level, coal-
fired power plants and natural-gas power plants respectively provided 42% and 8%
of the electricity used in Oregon in 2002. GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP, supra
note 146, at B-5 app. B tbl.2.
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ties,188 but emissions of methane and nitrous oxide also occur.189
Although these emissions are lesser in volume, the fact that the
global-warming potentials of methane and nitrous oxide are 21
and 310, respectively, evidences that these emissions are of regu-
latory concern.190
In sum, the preceding comparison of caps illustrates the Proto-
col’s greater regulatory breadth in three particulars.  First, the
Protocol regulates GHG-emissions sources in all fossil-fuel-burn-
ing economic sectors rather than just electricity generation.  Sec-
ond, within the electricity-generation sector, the Protocol
regulates more energy facilities, applying its caps to all existing
energy facilities.  And third, the Protocol’s caps are more com-
prehensive than those of the Standard, regulating emissions of six
GHGs rather than just CO2 emissions.
Similarly, in terms of offset projects, emissions credits, and
emissions trading, the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms are more
comprehensive than the Standard’s offset provision.  Although
the two actually have similar offset provisions, they are distinctly
different in terms of emissions credits and trading.
The Standard’s offset provision is arguably its most progressive
aspect.  It is essentially the equivalent of the Protocol’s CDM and
JI mechanisms.  Under the Protocol, the main distinction be-
tween JI and CDM projects is project location.  Annex I Parties
host JI projects; Non-Annex Parties host CDM projects.191
Aside from this distinction, CDM and JI projects serve the com-
mon purpose of enabling investing countries to meet their as-
signed amounts by implementing projects that offset CO2
emissions.  The Standard’s offset provision has the same purpose
applied to energy developers.  These developers can meet the
relevant CO2-emissions standard by directly or indirectly imple-
menting offset projects in any geographical location.192  Essen-
188 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF GREEN-
HOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2004 32 tbl.11, 47 tbl.19, 63 tbl.29 (2005),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/057304.pdf.
189 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS: 1990-2001 2-22 tbls.2-13 & 2-14 (2003), available at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/LHOD5MJQ6G/$File/
2003-final-inventory.pdf.
190 Id.  at 1-6 tbl.1-2.  Section II.B contains a description of the concept of “global
warming potential” in the text accompanying notes 74-75.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
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tially, the Standard’s offset provision encompasses the Protocol’s
JI and CDM mechanisms.
The distinct difference between the Protocol and the Standard
is that the latter does not provide for emissions credits or trading.
As described above, the Protocol allows Annex I Parties to earn
emissions credits by implementing CDM or JI projects, and to
sell those credits, or buy additional ones, under emissions trad-
ing.193  Furthermore, Annex I Parties may utilize emissions trad-
ing to buy and sell assigned-amount units in the same way.194
The Standard implements no equivalent system.  Energy devel-
opers invest in offset projects solely to meet the relevant CO2--
emissions standard in order to acquire site certificates for their
proposed facilities.  These developers do not invest in offset
projects in order to earn emissions credits, and there is no emis-
sions trading system in place where such credits, or assigned-
amount units, can be bought or sold.  In short, such a system sim-
ply just does not exist under the Standard.
This discussion of offsets, emissions credits, and emissions
trading illustrates one striking similarity and two distinct differ-
ences between the Protocol and Standard.  On one hand, the
Standard’s offset provision essentially encompasses the Proto-
col’s CDM and JI provisions.  On the other hand, the Standard
only allows developers to utilize offset projects to meet the CO2
emissions limit, and no emissions credit or trading systems are
implemented.
B. The West Coast Governors’ Global Warming Initiative:
Momentum for a Regional GHG Cap-and-Trade System
The comparison above illustrates that, although the Standard
is a progressive means of regulating GHG emissions from the
electricity-generation sector, the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system
is a more comprehensive regulatory mechanism.  Thus, the com-
parison suggests that Oregon could more effectively reduce
GHG emissions if it were to implement a regulatory program
that resembles the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system.  There is
growing momentum for such a system, extending from Oregon’s
193 See supra text accompanying note 89.
194 See supra text accompanying note 90.
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participation in the West Coast Governors’ Global Warming Ini-
tiative (Initiative).195
The Initiative was created in 2003 by the Governors of Ore-
gon, Washington, and California.196  It was formed based on the
mutual recognition that climate change “will have serious ad-
verse consequences on the economy, health and environment of
the West Coast states.”197  The West Coast states’ combined CO2
emissions rank seventh globally when compared to other coun-
tries.198  Accordingly, the Initiative represents the states’ com-
mitments to act “individually and regionally to reduce [GHG]
emissions through strategies that provide long-term sustainability
for the environment, protect public health, consider social equity,
and expand public awareness.”199  Like the RGGI, the Initiative
is currently one of the most progressive climate-policy efforts in
the United States.
In accord with the Initiative, Governor Kulongoski appointed
a Governor’s Advisory Group on Global Warming (GAGGW)
to develop the next phase of Oregon’s climate policy.200  The
GAGGW prepared a report in December 2004 setting forth rec-
ommendations for consideration by the Governor.201  Based on
these recommendations, Governor Kulongoski announced five
new initiatives in April 2005, including implementation of the
LEV standards discussed above.202  In addition to the GAGGW
report, the Initiative’s Executive Committee prepared a report
containing recommendations for similar regional policy mea-
sures.203  For the purposes of this Comment, the critical recom-
mendation discussed in both reports is the implementation of a
regional GHG cap-and-trade system.204
195 See EXECUTIVE COMM., WEST COAST GOVERNORS’ GLOBAL WARMING INITI-
ATIVE, WEST COAST GOVERNORS’ GLOBAL WARMING INITIATIVE STAFF RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNORS 14 (2004), http://www.oregon.gov/ ENERGY/
GBLWRM/docs/WCGGWINov04Report.pdf.
196 Id.  at 1.
197 Id.
198 Id.  at 4.
199 Id.  at 1 (internal quotations omitted).
200 See GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 146, at vii.
201 Id.  at iii-v.
202 Press Release, Governor Ted Kulongoski, Governor Announces New Steps to
Curb Global Warming in Oregon (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://gover-
nor.oregon.gov/Gov/press_041305a.shtml.
203 See EXECUTIVE COMM., supra note 195, at 1.
204 The Initiative’s recommendation is contained in the Executive Committee’s
report. Id.  at 14.  Notably, the Initiative has begun to send observers to the RGGI
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C. Implementing a Regional GHG Cap-and-Trade System
Modeled After the Protocol
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a sin-
gle courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labo-
ratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.205
—Justice Louis Brandeis
Thus far, this Comment has asserted that the comparison be-
tween the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system and the Standard’s
cap and offset provisions is useful because it demonstrates the
Protocol’s broader regulatory scope.  However, in conjunction
with the information contained in Part II, the comparison is also
useful because it identifies the Protocol’s distinct features and
regulatory approach.  Oregon policymakers who are interested in
implementing a regional GHG cap-and-trade system, even one
that exclusively regulates the electricity-generation sector, should
consider this information when determining that system’s design.
Like the comparison, this discussion about modeling is struc-
tured into two sections based on the Protocol’s cap provisions,
and emissions credits and trading systems.  With respect to caps,
there are at least four aspects of the Protocol’s regulatory ap-
proach and its features that should be considered for integration
into a regional system.
First, policymakers should consider emulating the Protocol’s
comprehensive regulatory approach.  Specifically, this would en-
tail (1) regulating emissions of the six GHGs covered under the
Protocol, and (2) imposing caps on emissions sources in the elec-
tricity-generation, transportation, industry, and commercial- and
residential-building sectors.  This approach would extend the
scope of regulatory coverage far beyond that of the Standard.
Ultimately, although there would be both obstacles and costs as-
sociated with implementing a regulatory system of this breadth,
this approach seems to be the most deliberate method for actu-
ally achieving reductions in GHG emissions.
design meetings in order to examine the political and economic issues associated
with implementation of a regional cap-and-trade system. See id.  at 10.  The
GAGGW’s recommendation is contained in its report. See also GOVERNOR’S ADVI-
SORY GROUP, supra note 146, at 68-71.
205 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Second, a top-down approach should be considered for setting
emissions-reduction goals.  Reflective of Oregon’s GHG-emis-
sions inventory, the regulatory system would tailor sector-wide
emissions targets to statewide reductions goals.  Overall, this top-
down approach would be a straightforward means of translating
the State’s broad goals into tangible terms.
Third, in relation to the Protocol’s commitment periods,206
policymakers should consider implementing a timetable whereby
GHG-emissions standards would be lowered incrementally over
set durations based on the State’s progress in meeting its emis-
sions goals.  Policymakers could synchronize this timetable with
the Protocol’s commitment periods in order to pace the eco-
nomic transformation resulting from GHG regulation with that
occurring within the Annex I parties that have ratified the Proto-
col.  Despite its technology-forcing effect, the regulated commu-
nity would likely appreciate a timetable structured in this fashion
because it would provide an even and predictable playing field
and promote gradual capacity building.207
Fourth, policymakers should consider establishing enforce-
ment provisions that punish violators for exceeding their caps.
These consequences may resemble those imposed under the Pro-
tocol’s enforcement mechanism,208 but ideally the measures
would be more stringent, including imposition of substantial
fines, requiring installation of emissions-reduction technologies,
or even ordering violators to cease or reduce operations.  Over-
all, adequate enforcement provisions would be central to the suc-
cess of the regulatory system in achieving actual reductions in
GHG emissions.
In light of the substantial increase in regulatory coverage that
would accompany implementation of a regional system modeled
as set out above, it may be wise for Oregon, like the RGGI, to
begin by implementing this system solely in the electricity-gener-
ation sector.  As described in Part III, this sector is the primary
206 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 3, paras. 1 & 7.
207 The remarks of Wayne H. Brunetti, the CEO and Chairman of Xcel Energy,
the fourth-largest electricity and gas utility in the United States, illustrate the
favorable reception that industry may have to an incremental timeline: “Give us a
date, tell us how much we need to cut, give us the flexibility to meet the goals, and
we’ll get it done.”  John Carey, Global Warming: Why Business Is Taking It So Seri-
ously , BUS. WK., Aug. 16, 2004, at 60, 64.
208 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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source of GHG emissions in Oregon.209  This reason alone pro-
vides good cause to start here.  In addition, Oregon is fortunate
in that energy developers’ experience with the Standard may ac-
tually make this sector the easiest in which to begin regulation.
The knowledge that the State has already gained under the Stan-
dard, as well as that which the State would gain by initially imple-
menting the cap-and-trade system here, could both be utilized
when extending the system into sectors that have not yet been
regulated.
In addition to considering the Protocol’s cap provisions, policy-
makers designing a regional system should also reflect on the
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms.  These mechanisms present
three features that should be considered for integration.
First, policymakers should consider implementing an emis-
sions-credits system that enables regulated entities to earn credits
for investing in carbon-offset projects.  Fortunately, the Stan-
dard’s offset provisions already provide a good model for such a
system, and it may be feasible to transplant this model beyond
the electricity-generation sector.  If this model were followed, the
Climate Trust could foreseeably continue to serve as a third-
party implementer and would likely provide an abundance of
knowledge on issues such as accounting, verification, and regis-
tration of emissions credits.
Second, an emissions-trading system should be considered in
conjunction with the emissions-credits system.  Like the Proto-
col’s Annex I Parties, regulated entities should be able to use this
system to buy and sell earned emissions credits and assigned-
amount units.210  At a minimum, emissions trading could occur at
the regional level among the West Coast states.  It may also be
possible to connect a West Coast emissions-trading system to the
RGGI to facilitate bicoastal trading.211  At the broadest level, al-
though mixed information appears on this point,212 the Initia-
tive’s Executive Committee indicates that “the European Union
has inserted a clause into their trading rules that will allow [emis-
209 See supra text accompanying note 159.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
211 See GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 146, at 70-71.
212 The Marrakesh Accords establish that emissions trading under the Protocol is
only available to Annex I Parties that have ratified the Protocol, suggesting that the
United States’ decision to not ratify will prevent the West Coast states from partici-
pating in such emissions trading.  Marrakesh Accords, Decision 15/CP.7, supra  note
83, para. 5.
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sions trading] between EU countries and U.S. states with compa-
rable programs, such as RGGI . . . .”213  Taken together, the
emissions credits and trading systems would enable regulated en-
tities to meet their emissions limits in the most cost-effective
manner and would be critically important if caps were set such
that they could not be met by employing state-of-the-art
technologies.
Third, policymakers should consider setting limits on the ex-
tent to which regulated entities may use the emissions credits and
trading systems in order to meet the caps.  In order to provide
certainty and consistency, it would be wise to set these limits at a
fixed percentage rather than just requiring use of the two systems
to be supplementary as does the Protocol.214  Overall, establish-
ing these limits would be beneficial because it would force regu-
lated entities to meet the caps by installing newer and cleaner
technologies.  This would promote the development and broad
diffusion of such technologies.  It would also promote equal dis-
tribution of the ancillary benefits associated with reductions of
GHG emissions such as reduced air pollution.
D. Obstacles to Implementing a Regional
GHG Cap-and-Trade System
Oregon’s implementation of a regional GHG cap-and-trade
system that contains all, or even some, of the foregoing features
would likely produce numerous benefits.  However, as discussed
in this section, obstacles and costs would also likely appear.  This
section primarily focuses on economic issues that might arise, but
also identifies some interesting legal issues.  As will appear evi-
dent from the information below, the core reason for the poten-
tial, or even probable, existence of these obstacles and costs is
the absence of a federal GHG regulatory program.215
In the short term, implementation of a regional cap-and-trade
system might be detrimental to Oregon’s economy, promote eco-
nomic development in nonregulatory states, and ultimately fail to
achieve reductions in GHG emissions.  The core reason that
these results may occur is that regulated entities may “run for the
border” in order to escape Oregon’s GHG regulations.  The
GAGGW has already recognized this concern with respect to the
213 See EXECUTIVE COMM., supra note 195, at 10.
214 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 17.
215 See McKinstry, supra note 102, at 13-14.
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electricity-generation sector.216  Simply put, energy developers
seeking to avoid Oregon’s GHG-emissions limits may develop
power plants in nonregulatory neighboring states.217  Ultimately,
this avoidance would increase Oregon’s dependence on out-of-
state energy sources, diminish employment opportunities, and
hinder the generation of tax revenues.218  These concerns are
equally valid when considered in relation to other economic sec-
tors where regulations might be imposed.  Oregon’s GHG-emis-
sions limits may influence regulated industries, commercial and
residential property developers, and manufacturers in the trans-
portation sector to react in the same manner that the GAGGW
envisions energy developers might—causing these entities to not
enter, or even leave, the State.  In the end, this behavior would
seemingly result in a pattern of displaced development that does
not correlate with an overall decrease in GHG emissions but
rather merely alters the locations of emissions sources.219
Implementation of a regional cap-and-trade system might also
have adverse economic effects on Oregon consumers.  This result
may occur due to regulated entities’ internalizing their adapta-
tion costs into the market prices of their goods.  For example, the
costs incurred by a regulated energy facility that has installed
GHG-friendly technologies might be passed on to consumers in
the form of higher electricity rates.  This internalization could
foreseeably occur with respect to goods produced by regulated
industries throughout the State.  In sum, at least in the short
term, it appears Oregon consumers may have to pay to mitigate
climate change via a regional system.
In addition to the potential adverse economic effects, Oregon’s
implementation of a regional cap-and-trade system may also re-
sult in litigation being brought under the U.S. Constitution.  The
following cursory discussion focuses on three constitutional chal-
lenges that may arise, each of which involves issues of federalism.
First, a challenge to the regional system may be presented
under the Commerce Clause.220  Oregon’s imposition of caps on
emissions sources may be construed as interfering with interstate




220 The Commerce Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce and implicate Dormant Commerce Clause issues.221
In the absence of facial or operative discrimination, the courts
would foreseeably use the balancing test set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church  to determine the constitutionality of Oregon’s
caps.222  Ultimately, it is likely that the caps would be upheld
under the Pike test because the incidental impacts that they may
potentially impose on interstate commerce would not be exces-
sive in proportion to Oregon’s legitimate interest in protecting
itself from the potential adverse impacts of climate change.223
Second, if Oregon’s regulatory system interfaces with a West
Coast regional effort, it may be challenged under the Compacts
Clause on the grounds that congressional approval is lacking.224
As announced in Virginia v. Tennessee , the critical determination
would be whether the regional system is intended to “increase
and build up the political influence of the contracting states, so as
to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States,
or interfere with their rightful management of particular subjects
placed under their entire control.”225  In short, if this is not in fact
the West Coast states’ intention, the regional system is not the
type of compact that requires congressional approval.226  Based
on U.S. Steel Corp ., where the Court applied this rule to uphold a
multistate effort to develop tax policy that was implemented on a
statewide basis, it is likely that the regional system would survive
a Compacts Clause challenge.227
Finally, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,228 Oregon’s regula-
tory program might be subject to a federal preemption chal-
221 See McKinstry, supra note 105, at 67-69.
222 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).  The Pike Court described the
applicable balancing test for determining the constitutionality of non-discriminatory
and non-protectionist state laws that affect interstate commerce as follows: “Where
the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest ,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.” Id.  at 142 (emphasis added).
223 See McKinstry, supra note 105, at 68-69.
224 Id.  at 67, 69-70.  The Compacts Clause provides: “No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,
or with a foreign Power . . . .” U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
225 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
226 See id.
227 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 496 (1978); see also
McKinstry, supra note 105, at 70 n.320.
228 The Supremacy Clause provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
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lenge.229  Specifically, this is a foreseeable problem with respect
to Oregon’s implementation of the LEV standards, where the
federal Clean Air Act or the fuel-economy standards set under
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act may have preemptive
effect.230  In Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon ,231
California’s GHG-emissions standards for vehicles have been
challenged by thirteen California automobile dealers and the Al-
liance of Automobile Manufacturers on preemption grounds of
this exact nature.232  The outcome of that litigation will be telling.
E. Benefits of Implementing a Regional
GHG Cap-and-Trade System
Notwithstanding the obstacles and costs discussed above, a
number of benefits would also potentially result from implement-
ing a regional GHG cap-and-trade system modeled after the Pro-
tocol.  This section identifies three types: policy benefits,
economic benefits, and environmental benefits.
The term “policy benefits” is used to describe the beneficial
effects that implementation of a regional cap-and-trade system
could have on the development of local, state, national, and in-
ternational climate policy.  These policy benefits could come in at
least two forms.
First, implementation of a regional system may stimulate the
development of climate policy within the United States.  Specifi-
cally, it may motivate the federal government to implement a
regulatory program either independent of, or in conjunction
with, ratifying the Protocol.233  Implementation of a regional sys-
tem would reinforce the existing message that Oregon and other
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
229 See McKinstry, supra note 105, at 67-68, 70-72.
230 See id.  at 70-71.
231 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. 1:04-CV-06663 (E.D. Cal.
filed Dec. 7, 2004).
232 See McKinstry, supra note 105, at 70-72; Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State
Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally , NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T,
Winter 2004, 46, 47-48 (2004).
233 The express intent of the Initiative is to incite the development of state and
federal climate policy: “The Governors of the West Coast states have concluded that
our states must act individually and regionally to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
and to establish precedents that will spur the development of climate policies in other
states and at the federal level .” EXECUTIVE COMM., supra note 195, at 4 (emphasis
added).
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states have sent to the federal government on this issue: climate
change is a priority that must be addressed.  Notwithstanding this
reinforcing effect, the patchwork regulatory environment that
could result due to implementation of a regional system may
hold even greater weight in motivating the federal government to
act.234  The existence of GHG regulations in West Coast states,
and the absence of them in adjacent states, would create a varia-
ble regulatory scheme that would likely inconvenience and deter
regulated entities.  Accordingly, the federal government may
choose to assume the regulatory helm in order to provide the
regulated community with uniform and predictable GHG
regulations.235
In addition to promoting the development of a federal regula-
tory program, a regional system would also be beneficial as a ref-
erence model for governmental entities at all levels seeking to
develop or refine GHG cap-and-trade systems.  Such a system
could provide a direct model for other states and municipali-
ties.236  Furthermore, it may provide useful information to facili-
tate the development of a federal regulatory system.237  This
would be particularly true if the federal system were designed in
a decentralized form whereby national GHG-emissions limits
were established and states were individually responsible for im-
plementing programs to meet the federal limits.  The pre-exis-
tence of a regional system would simply expedite implementation
of the federal system.  Finally, at the international level, a re-
gional system might provide valuable experiential information
that could be used to refine the Protocol.  Such information
might include: successful accounting, verification, and registra-
tion methods for the emissions credits and trading systems, as
well as feasible limits to impose upon the use of these systems for
meeting emissions limits.
Economic benefits are the second form of benefits that would
result from implementation of a regional GHG cap-and-trade
system.  I have grouped these into two categories: (1) first-
mover-advantage benefits, and (2) adaptive-advantage benefits.
234 See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 232, at 49 (discussing how the Standard
contributes to the type of disjunct regulatory environment that may promote imposi-
tion of federal GHG regulations within the electricity-generation sector).
235 See id.
236 Kosloff, supra  note 1, at 181-82.
237 Id.
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Companies in Oregon and the other West Coast states might
gain first-mover-advantage benefits by being the first to enter
previously underdeveloped or nonexistent markets.  The primary
such benefit is the potential for these companies to develop the
novel technologies and services needed to comply with a GHG
regulatory system.  Ultimately, the development and diffusion of
these technologies and services may result in substantial eco-
nomic growth and job creation.238  The Initiative has recognized
this possibility with respect to the renewable energy segment of
the electricity-generation sector.239  Simply put, the regional sys-
tem’s emissions-limits and emissions-credits provisions would
likely promote the development of renewable energy technolo-
gies associated with wind, solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric
facilities.240  The reasons for this growth are twofold: (1) renewa-
ble energy facilities will not be required to adhere to emissions
limits because they do not emit GHGs, and (2) fossil-fuel-based
energy facilities may invest in renewable energy facilities as off-
set projects.  The potential for technological development and
job creation is also relevant in other regulated sectors, including
the potential for the development of energy-conservation and en-
ergy-efficiency technologies in the industrial and commercial-
and residential-buildings sectors, and the development of low- or
zero-emission vehicles and other forms of transit in the transpor-
tation sector.241  Finally, in addition to the potential for techno-
logical development, another noteworthy first-mover-advantage
benefit is the potential for regulated entities to secure the most
inexpensive carbon-sequestration projects prior to possible fed-
eral GHG regulation.242
In addition to the first-mover-advantage benefits, the enact-
ment of a regional system would also be economically beneficial
because it would prepare regulated entities within Oregon and
238 Dernbach, supra note 2, at 194-95.
239 See EXECUTIVE COMM., supra note 195, at 5.
240 See id.  The Executive Committee states that the global renewable-energy sec-
tor is “poised to expand more than tenfold over the next twenty years, to more than
$180 billion a year.” Id.  It should also be noted that development in the renewable-
energy sector would be beneficial because it would likely decrease domestic depen-
dency on oil imports, see id. , and diminish the associated national-security risks.
241 See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 194-95; Carey, supra note 207, at 61-63
(describing progressive actions taken by companies to invest in new GHG-friendly
technologies and thereby reap the associated benefits and dominance in the
marketplace).
242 See McKinstry, supra note 105, at 67.
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the other West Coast states for the implementation of a federal
GHG regulatory system.  This is referred to as “adaptive advan-
tage.”  Although it remains to be seen whether the federal gov-
ernment will implement a regulatory program, either
independent of, or in conjunction with, ratifying the Protocol,
several reasons suggest that such regulation will occur.  First,
U.S. businesses may desire to participate in emissions trading
with other Annex I Parties, but would be prevented from doing
so due to non-ratification.243  Second, the United States may wish
to avoid the trade restrictions that Annex I Parties that have rati-
fied the Protocol could impose on imports from non-ratifying
countries.244  Third, the potential economic growth associated
with the development and diffusion of GHG-reducing technolo-
gies may prompt federal regulation to stimulate this market.
And fourth, as discussed above, the existence of a patchwork pat-
tern of state or regional GHG regulatory systems may necessitate
uniform federal regulations.  Ultimately, irrespective of which
factor motivates federal action, presently implementing a re-
gional system would familiarize regulated entities within Oregon
and the other West Coast states with the regulatory environment,
giving them a preparatory advantage over nonregulated entities
located elsewhere.
Environmental benefits are the third type of benefits that
would likely result from implementation of a regional system.
The central point in this area is simply that GHG emissions
would likely be reduced.  In turn, these reductions would miti-
gate, to a small extent, the potential impacts of climate change
discussed in Part I.  To reiterate, in the Pacific Northwest, these
potential impacts include increased flooding, landslides, erosion,
coastal inundation, risk to forest areas from fires and pest infes-
tation, heat waves, heat-related illnesses and deaths, risk of in-
sect-transmitted water-borne diseases; and decreased municipal
and agricultural water, water quality, and salmon populations.245
243 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
244 Olav Schram Stokke, Trade Measures, WTO and Climate Compliance: The In-
terplay of International Regimes , in IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTER-
NATIONAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 147, 148-50.  Mr. Stokke points to three
possible trade measures that may be imposed on imports from nonratifying coun-
tries: import restrictions, border taxes, and energy-efficiency standards. Id.  at 149.
If Oregon and the other West Coast states were able to avoid imposition of these
trade measures on their respective exports, this would be an additional economic
benefit of implementing a regional system modeled after the Protocol.
245 Nat’l Assessment Synthesis Team, supra note 37, at 70-73.
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In addition to the slight mitigation of these impacts, reduced
GHG emissions would also mean reduced air pollution,246 and
may also indirectly result in reduced water and land-based pollu-
tion due to decreased extraction and storage of fossil fuels.
In sum, the comparison of the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system
and the Standard’s cap and offset provisions reveals that the Pro-
tocol is a more comprehensive and effective mechanism for regu-
lating GHG emissions.  Extending from Oregon’s involvement in
the Initiative, policymakers in the State should reference the Pro-
tocol as a model when designing the regional GHG cap-and-
trade system currently under consideration.  Ultimately, although
the State would likely have to contend with some of the afore-
mentioned obstacles and costs associated with implementing such
a system, the potential for substantial policy, economic, and envi-
ronmental benefits provides a powerful incentive to harness Ore-
gon’s pioneer spirit in this manner.
V
CONCLUSION
The scope, magnitude, and inequity of the potential impacts of
climate change mandate that policymakers on all governmental
levels presently accept the daunting task of regulating GHG
emissions in a fossil-fuel-dependent world.  In the process of im-
plementing climate policies tailored to mitigate these adverse im-
pacts, it appears inevitable that the existing global economy and
development model will be forced to undergo significant
changes.  It seems that the future must hold a carbon-constrained
world.  The Protocol’s entry into force facilitates this historical
transition.  The Protocol’s GHG-emissions limits, credits, and
trading systems will have a gradual and marked influence on the
global economy and path of sustainable development.  Unfortu-
nately, although the United States is both the historic and cur-
rent leader in GHG emissions, it has not assumed a premier
leadership role in this monumental international effort, as evi-
denced by its decisions to not ratify the Protocol and to not im-
plement a federal GHG regulatory system.
In light of these considerations, the State of Oregon is placed
in an unsettling position.  On one hand, current climate policies
in the State demonstrate a concern, willingness, and spirit akin to
246 See EXECUTIVE COMM., supra note 195, at 5.
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those of the ratifying Annex I Parties, the RGGI states, and the
states and localities presently involved in climate-change litiga-
tion.  On the other hand, current federal inaction discourages
and potentially constrains Oregon from implementing more ag-
gressive climate policies.  This is an untimely dilemma.  There is a
finite window of opportunity in which it would be ideal for Ore-
gon to act in order to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate
change in the most effective manner and maximize the associated
economic and policy benefits.
This Comment has described how implementing a regional
GHG cap-and-trade system modeled after the Protocol is a pref-
erable course of action for Oregon and the West Coast states to
take at this critical time.  Notwithstanding the potential obstacles
and costs, which should not be overlooked or understated, such
implementation would foreseeably spur the development of cli-
mate policy on all governmental levels, promote lucrative eco-
nomic growth associated with the development and diffusion of
GHG-friendly technologies, and mitigate the numerous and se-
vere impacts that climate change will potentially inflict in the Pa-
cific Northwest.  Ultimately, by implementing a regional system
shaped in light of the Protocol, Oregon and the other West Coast
states will be poised to become part of a federal GHG regulatory
program, as well as to join the Annex I Parties in the interna-
tional response, should such implementation and ratification
occur.
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